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INTERMEDIATE INEQUALITY AND WELFARE:
THE CASE OF SPAIN, 1980–81 TO 1990–91




Uniûersidad Carlos III de Madrid
The 1990–91 household expenditures distribution in Spain dominates, in the relative (‘‘rightist’’)
Lorenz sense, the 1980–81 distribution, but the latter dominates the former in the absolute (‘‘leftist’’)
Lorenz sense. This situation constitutes a textbook case for intermediate or ‘‘centrist’’ notions of
inequality and social welfare. This paper presents the ﬁrst empirical application of this sort, using the
intermediate inequality concept introduced in Del Rı ´o and Ruiz-Castillo (2000). The data reveal that
there is a decrease in household expenditures inequality for a relatively small set of centrist attitudes.
INTRODUCTION
This paper studies the evolution of household expenditures inequality and
social welfare in Spain during the 1980s. This is an interesting period of highly
unusual political characteristics, in which the Socialist party occupied power
through democratic means for the ﬁrst time in 40 years.
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Using standard methods developed by Shorrocks (1983) and Moyes (1987),
Del Rı ´o and Ruiz-Castillo (1996) found that the 1990–91 household expenditures
distribution in Spain had a greater mean, less relative inequality but more absol-
ute inequality than the 1980–81 comparable distribution.
2 However, the following
empirical question cannot be answered with the present tools: is the 1990–91
expenditures distribution in Spain ‘‘barely better’’ than the 1980–81 distribution
from the relative point of view, and consequently ‘‘far away’’ from the absolute
one; or is it ‘‘so much better’’ from the relative perspective that it is ‘‘nearly
equivalent’’ to it from the absolute point of view? In other words, present methods
only address yes-or-no questions relative to the two polar cases, but in situations
Note: This work is part of the ﬁrst author’s PhD dissertation, and has been carried out under
the auspices of the ECC TMR Contract #ERBFMRXCT980248. Financial help from Project PB96-
0118 of the Spanish DGES is gratefully acknowledged.
1Recall that Spain achieved a democratic regime during the mid 1970s, and became a full member
of the European Community in 1986. Ever since 1978, Spain has been involved in a complex process
of economic modernization and liberalization, while striving at the same time to catch up for lost
time in the setting up of a Welfare State comparable to that existing in other Western societies. For
the development of the Spanish economy over the last four decades, see Martin (1999).
2Except for Portugal, which has gone through similar political and economic reforms since the
mid 1970s, this is a different trend from most OECD countries. For Portugal, see Gouveia and Tavares
(1995) and Rodrigues (1993); for the international experience see, for instance, Atkinson, Rainwater,
and Smeeding (1995) and Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997); for Spain, see Del Rı ´o and Ruiz-Castillo
(1996, 2001); and for a comparison between Portugal and Spain, see Jimeno et al. (2000).
1like the Spanish one during the 1980s they remain silent on whether the decrease
in relative inequality (or the increase in absolute inequality) is ‘‘large’’ or ‘‘small.’’
In order to provide an answer to this question, it is reasonable to use ‘‘cen-
trist’’ or intermediate notions of inequality between the ‘‘rightist’’ (relative) and
the ‘‘leftist’’ (absolute) cases in Kolm (1976a, 1976b) terminology. This paper
presents the ﬁrst empirical application of an intermediate inequality concept and
the associated class of intermediate social welfare functions. The intermediate
inequality notion used is the one introduced in Del Rı ´o and Ruiz-Castillo
(2000)—DRRC, for short—which depends on an initial income or expenditures
distribution x and a parameter value π in the unit interval. Two income distri-
butions x and y are said to have the same (x, π )-inequality if the total income
difference between them is allocated among the individuals as follows: π 100 per-
cent preserving income shares in x, and (1Aπ )100 percent in equal absolute
amounts.
The problem, of course, is that there are no a priori reasons to determine
which centrist attitudes, or which range of π values, should be adopted to com-
pare any given pair of income distributions. This paper develops an operational
procedure to allow the data to reveal this to us: we estimate the range of π values,
(π 1, π 2) in the interval [0, 1], for which the 1990 91 and the 1980 81 distributions
are equivalent in terms of inequality. In this way, it is learned for what type of
intermediate attitudes there has been a reduction in inequality—for people with
‘‘center-right’’ attitudes in the interval [π 2,1 ] —or an increase in inequality—for
people with ‘‘center-left’’ attitudes in the interval [0, π 1]. Then, taking into
account the mean income change during this period, one can unambiguously
conclude whether the 1990–91 income distribution is superior, inferior or non-
comparable to the 1980–81 distribution for all centrist social evaluation functions
in an appropriately deﬁned class.
To apply this methodology in practice, it must be extended to the hetero-
geneous case in which individuals come grouped in households with different
non-income needs. In this paper, household size is taken as the only household
characteristic deﬁning ethically relevant non-income needs. To pool all house-
holds in a common distribution, in the relative case Buhmann et al. (1988) and
Coulter, Cowell, and Jenkins (1992a, 1992b) suggest a parametric model of equiv-
alence scales which allows for different views about the importance of economies
of scale in consumption within the household. Based on the ideas presented in
Ruiz-Castillo (1998) for the absolute case, the model is extended to the intermedi-
ate case and the connection between the parametrization of economies of scale in
the three cases is established.
The data used are the two latest Encuestas de Presupuestos Familiares (EPFs
for short), conducted by the INE (Instituto Nacional de Estadı ´stica) from April
1980 to March 1981 and from April 1990 to March 1991. These are comparable
household budget surveys, used primarily for estimating the ofﬁcial weights of
the Consumer Price Index. They provide the best microeconomic information on
the evolution of the standard of living in Spain during this period.
For the population as a whole, the main result of the paper is that there is a
decrease in household expenditures inequality for a relatively small set of centrist
attitudes. For a second small group, with views slightly further to the left in the
2political spectrum, inequality differences are not statistically signiﬁcant. For the
rest of the population, inequality has increased. The results for the subgroups in
the partition by household size, indicate that the reduction in intermediate
inequality is much greater for smaller than for larger households.
The rest of the paper is divided into four sections and an Appendix. Section
I justiﬁes the use of intermediate inequality notions in situations like the Spanish
one during this period. Section II presents the concept of intermediate inequality
used in the paper, and describes how it can be made operational by using Lorenz
comparisons, both in the homogeneous and the heterogeneous cases. Section III
contains the empirical results, while section IV concludes. The Appendix contains
the results for the partition by household size.
I. WHY SHOULD WE USE INTERMEDIATE INEQUALITY MEASURES?
Traditionally, welfare economics is concerned with evaluation methods
which take into account an efﬁciency preference for larger incomes, and an equity
preference for less vertical inequality. Moreover, it is desirable that empirical
methods call for a minimum of value judgments. In particular, it is desirable to
have unambiguous rankings according to which social welfare increases only if
efﬁciency and distribution both improve. Let WR and WA denote the two classes
of SEFs which, apart from the usual assumptions (continuity, S-concavity and
population replication invariance—see Lambert (1993) for a discussion), have a
social preference for efﬁciency consistent with the relative and absolute inequality
notions, respectively. Shorrocks (1983) and Moyes (1987) develop operational
procedures in order to investigate whether one income or expenditures distri-
bution is better than another for all of the SEFs belonging, respectively, to each
of these two classes.
Let us assume that two income distributions x and y in two different
moments in time must be compared, and assume that distribution y has a greater
mean than x. If distribution y dominates x in the absolute Lorenz sense, then y
is better than x according to all SEFs in WA. This should be the end of the
analysis, because who would deny that there has been an unambiguous increase
in social welfare? Only people who believe that, to maintain inequality constant,
any excess income should be distributed so as to assign greater absolute amounts
to the poor than to the rich.
Suppose, however, that distribution y dominates distribution x in the relative
Lorenz sense, but that x dominates y in the absolute Lorenz sense.
3 This is exactly
the case in Spain during the 1980s, where y is the 1990–91 household expenditures
distribution and x is the 1980–81 distribution. The situation is summarized in
Table 1. Column 1 indicates that there is a general increase in mean expenditures,
especially among households within the ﬁrst six deciles, whose mean expenditures
grow above the average. Correspondingly, expenditures’ shares by deciles in
1990–91 (column 3) are larger than in 1980–81 (column 2), pointing out toward
relative Lorenz dominance by the 1990–91 expenditures distribution. Finally,
3For some SEFs more sensitive to the increase in inequality than to the increase in the mean,
distribution y may show a lower welfare level in the absolute sense, whereas other indices with the
opposite characteristics may lead to the opposite conclusion.
3TABLE 1
RELATIVE AND ABSOLUTE INCREASES IN MEAN HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURES
DURING THE 1980s IN SPAIN, AND EXPENDITURES’ SHARES BY DECILES IN
1980–81 VERSUS 1990–91
Expenditures’ Shares
Relative Increase Absolute Increase
Deciles in Expenditures 1980–81 1990–91 in Expenditures
1 37.5 3.13 3.39 142,570
2 31.7 4.90 5.09 188,900
3 29.9 6.05 6.20 219,688
4 29.4 7.08 7.23 252,857
5 29.0 8.15 8.28 286,651
6 28.4 9.30 9.42 321,041
7 27.4 10.66 10.69 354,112
8 26.5 12.39 12.37 399,001
9 24.3 15.09 14.78 445,599
10 23.0 23.25 22.55 649,667
Total 26.8 100.0 100.0 326,062
Note: Adjusted expenditures distributionGunadjusted expenditure distribution
(household size)
Θ , with Θ G0.4. Both expenditures distributions are expressed at constant
prices of the 1991 winter.
absolute increases in mean expenditures in column 4 are below the population’s
average for the ﬁrst six deciles and above it for the remaing four deciles, pointing
toward absolute Lorenz dominance by the 1980–81 expenditures distribution.
4
An equivalent situation in income space is illustrated in Figure 1 in the two-
dimensional case. Line 1–1 represents all income distributions with the same
mean income as distribution x, while line 2–2 represents all income distributions
with the same mean income as y. Ray O–R is the ray from the origin, which
contains all income distributions with the same relative inequality as x, while
A–A is the ray parallel to the 45° line, which contains all income distributions
with the same absolute inequality as x. Present methods only allow us to say that
distribution y falls somewhere on the line 2–2 between rays O–R and A–A. This
paper claims that it is important to know whether the intermediate or centrist ray
joining both distributions is nearer to O–Ro rt oA –A.
As will be seen below, our procedures allow the data to reveal a set of inter-
mediate rays through x containing distribution y. These rays serve to identify the
set of centrist inequality notions for which x and y are equivalent in terms of
inequality. For argument’s sake, let us assume that distribution y can actually be
placed in a single intermediate ray I–I as in Figure 1. Then, for moderately
minded people with a view of inequality between the ray I–I and the rightist or
relative ray O–R, it could be said that social welfare would unambiguously
increase by shifting from x to y. Whereas for people of a more radical political
tendency, whose concept of inequality lies between the ray I–I and the leftist or
absolute ray A–A, y would show both a greater mean and a greater inequality
than x. In this case, both situations would be non-comparable in terms of social
welfare.
4For a rigorous discussion about relative and absolute Lorenz dominance during the 1980s in
Spain, see Del Rı ´o and Ruiz-Castillo (1996). For a complete summary of their results, see section
III.2.
4Figure 1. Constant (OR), Absolute (AA), and Intermediate (II) Income Inequality Viewed from
Income Distribution x
An obvious alternative is to use speciﬁc inequality indices deﬁned in the
space of all possible income distributions. In this case, quantitative conclusions
about the decrease in relative inequality or about the increase in the absolute one
could be always obtained. In fact, using an appropriate SEF deﬁned in that space,
all doubts as to whether the increase in the mean compensates the increase in
expenditures inequality would be also dispelled. However, we wish to offer the
following three reasons for adopting the new approach:
(1) From the theoretical point of view, it seems interesting to use intermediate
notions of inequality which respond to value judgments other than those normally
held in the usual relative and absolute polar cases. Indeed, recent works based on
inquiries into these issues have shown that people are by no means unanimous
when choosing between a relative, an absolute or an intermediate inequality
concept.
5 Thus, the majority of scholars prefer a relative notion of inequality for
technical or other reasons, while, because of the inﬂuence of their political atti-
tudes toward redistribution or of other considerations of which we are unaware,
most people appear to be in favor of an absolute or an intermediate concept of
inequality. Then, as stated in the conclusions reached in Ballano and Ruiz-
Castillo (1993), perhaps the time has come to change the current consensus and
5See Amiel and Cowell (1999). In the Spanish case, Ballano and Ruiz-Castillo (1993) found that,
for the subsample that showed an acceptable degree of consistency over the questionnaire, only
31 percent supported a relative view of inequality, 24 percent supported an absolute view, and
27 percent an intermediate notion (the rest supported other extreme views).
5use other types of inequality more often, as Kolm (1976a, 1976b) and Bossert and
Pﬁngsten (1990), for example, have recommended.
(2) As far as the empirical work is concerned, it should be emphasized that
the vast majority of the extensive literature available focuses on the measurement
of relative inequality. There is also a handful of papers which measure absolute
inequality—see, for instance, Blackorby, Donaldson, and Auersperg (1981) and
Ruiz-Castillo (1998). However, even though there are various proposals for the
measurement of intermediate inequality, there is still not a single empirical study
on this topic.
(3) We have no doubts about the interest of using measurement instruments
endowed with the property of completeness, but this strategy calls for additional
strong assumptions which are unnecessary in this paper’s approach. In general,
it is advisable to evaluate the evolution of income inequality with the help of as
few value judgments as possible. The reason is that the conclusions which may
be reached with the minimalist approach that is proposed in this paper should be
acceptable to a wider spectrum of people than those obtainable with complete
inequality and social welfare indicators.










H. Then D denotes the set of all possible ordered
income distributions in R
H
++ . Any real valued function I deﬁned on D satisfying
continuity, S-convexity and population replication invariance is called an income
inequality measure. For later reference, let S be the H-dimensional simplex and,
for any x∈D, let vxG(û
1,...,û
H)∈S be the vector of income shares with û
hGx
h
X, where XGΣ hx
h is the aggregate income associated to distribution x. 1 denotes
a row vector whose components are all ones, while e denotes the vector (1H)1
in S.
II.2 The (x, π )-Inequality Concept
An inequality index is said to be a relative inequality measure if it takes the
same value along H-dimensional rays from the origin, i.e. whenever I(x)GI(λ x)
for all x∈D and for all λ H0 (scale invariance). An inequality index is said to be
an absolute inequality measure if it adopts the same value along H-dimensional
rays parallel to the line of equality, i.e., whenever I(x)GI(xCµ 1) for all x∈D and
for all µ ∈R such that (xCµ 1)∈ D (translation invariance).
Similarly, the simplest kind of intermediate inequality measures which is con-
sidered in this paper, requires that the set of income distributions with the same
intermediate inequality is also a ray in H-dimensional space. An intermediate
inequality concept of this kind is presented in DRRC, where those rays are con-
structed as follows. Given a reference distribution x∈D and a value of π ∈[0, 1],
consider the set P(x, π )(·) of all income distributions obtained in such a way that
π 100 percent of any extra income is assigned to individuals according to the
6income share vector v, and the remaining (1Aπ )100 percent is allocated in equal
absolute amounts. Formally:
P(x,π )(x)G{y∈D :yGxCτ [π vxC(1Aπ )e], τ ∈R}
A real function I(x, π )(·):D→ R is said to be a (x, π )-inequality measure if and
only if I(x, π )(x)GI(x, π )(y) for any y∈P (x, π )(x).
An example will help to understand this inequality notion. Let xG(200, 800)
and π G0.5. Then π 100G50 percent of all income differences are allocated
according to the income shares vector vxG(15, 45), and (1− π )100G50 percent
in equal absolute amounts according to the proportions (12, 12). Thus, the
(x, π )-ray of income distributions through x is given by
P(x, π )(x)G{y∈R 2;++ :yGxCτ (72, 1320), τ ∈R}.
Suppose there are τ G100 extra units of income. If thirty-ﬁve units are allocated
to the ﬁrst individual and sixty-ﬁve units to the second one according to the
proportions (720, 1320), then the new distribution yG(235, 865) would have
the same (x, π )-inequality as x.
6
Informally, we may say that a value of π G0.9 reﬂects a center-right attitude,
while a value of π 0 4 reﬂects a center left perception of inequality The reason,
of course, is that according to the ﬁrst view, inequality is maintained if only
10 percent of any excess income is distributed according to the more demanding
absolute criterion, while the second requires 60 percent to be allocated that way.
On the other hand, notice that if π G1, (x, π )-inequality becomes the relative
view, whereas π G0 leads to the absolute view.
All intermediate inequality measures necessarily depend on an initial situ-
ation. Although some readers may ﬁnd this a disadvantage, we agree with
Pﬁngsten and Seidl (1997) when they assert that the meaning of ‘‘centrist’’ need
not be decided universally, but can be made contingent on the situations we know
and hence can evaluate well. In the previous numerical example, from the view-
point of distribution y the two distributions would have the same (y, π ′ )-
inequality, but π ′ would now be greater than π G0.5—see Proposition 1 in
DRRC. The interpretation is clear: the same centrist attitude is captured when,
starting from x G(200, 800), 50 percent of the income difference between X and
Y is allocated according to vxG(15, 45), and 50 percent in equal absolute
amounts, as when, starting from y, π ′ percent of the income difference is allocated
according to vyG(0.21, 0.79) and (1Aπ ′ ) in equal absolute amounts. The reason
why π ′H0.5 is that y has less relative inequality than x. Thus, to get down to x
from y so as to preserve intermediate inequality, the pattern vy can be more closely
followed than the pattern vx from x—see DRRC for a more thorough discussion
of this issue.
As shown in DRRC, our notion is a subset of the class of α -invariant
inequality measures discussed in Pﬁngsten and Seidl (1997). The reason for choos-
ing the (x,π )-inequality concept is twofold. In the ﬁrst place, it has a clear econ-
omic interpretation, which is not the case of the α -invariant concept. In the
6Technically speaking, the deﬁnition of (x,π )-inequality does not call for the distribution whose
inequality we want to evaluate to coincide with the reference distribution x. For the properties and
further details of this notion, see DRRC.
7second place, it can be made operational by means of certain comparisons accord-
ing to the usual Lorenz criterion.
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II.3 Operational Methods: The Homogeneous Case
For any pair of income distributions x,y∈D, let vxLvy denote weak Lorenz
dominance. Let also m(x) represent the mean of distribution x. For any x∈D and
π ∈[0, 1], denote by W(x, π ) the class of SEFs which, apart from the three common
assumptions of continuity, S-concavity and population replication invariance,
have a social preference for efﬁciency consistent with (x, π )-inequality. Let us
identify x and y with the 1980–81 and 1990–91 Spanish income distributions at
constant prices, respectively. Then we know that m(y)Hm(x), vyLvx but eLvy. The
question we want to answer is the following: for which π values can we conclude
that W(x, π )(y)HW(x π )(x)?
There is no a priori given reasonable set of π values to take into account in
this social welfare evaluation exercise. The paper’s strategy is to allow the data
to provide an answer to the above question. One proceeds as follows. Fix τ GY–
XH0, and deﬁne the set of rays
(1) c(π ) xCτ [π vxC(1 π )e], π ∈[0, 1]
Notice that for any π , c(π ) has the same mean as y and the same (x, π )-inequality
as x. If there were to exist a π * in the unit interval such that yGc(π *) then we
would be done. The reason is that, for any π Hπ *,y would have a smaller (x, π )-
inequality than x. Taking into account that m(y)Hm(x), we would conclude that
W(y)HW(x) for all SEFs W(·) belonging to the class W(x, π )(·) for all π ∈[ π *, 1].
In general, there will be no such π *. In other words, the intermediate space to
which y belongs, that is, the set of all income distributions with less relative
inequality but more absolute inequality than x, is far richer than the set of distri-
butions attainable by choosing successive values of π in equation (1)—for the
relationship of these two sets in a three-dimensional example, see DRRC.
What we can be certain of, is that there is a range of π values for which y
has more (x,π )-inequality than x, another set for which it has less, and another
set for which both distributions are non-comparable from the point of view of
(x,π )-inequality. Thus, what is done in the general case is to ﬁnd a partition of
the unit interval into these three subsets. In the ﬁrst place, by making the pertinent
Lorenz curves comparisons, one searches empirically for the lower value of π , π 2 ,
such that yLc(π ) for any π ∈[ π 2 , 1]. Then, by applying Theorem 1 in DRRC, it
can be concluded that W(y)HW(x) for all the SEFs W(·) belonging to the class
W(x, π )(·) for all π ∈[ π 2 , 1]. In the second place, one searches for the greater value
of π , π 1 , such that c(π )Ly for any π ∈[0, π 1 ]. For the centrist inequality views
represented by that range of π values, I(x, π )(y)HI(x, π )(x). Since m(y)Hm(x), for
this range of π values an unambigous conclusion in terms of welfare cannot be
7There are other ray-invariant intermediate inequality notions, like the one suggested by Kolm
(1976a, 1976b) or the single parameter µ -inequality concept proposed by Bossert and Pﬁngsten (1990).
Unfortunately, as pointed out by Pﬁngsten and Seidl (1997), the latter has a serious disadvantage: it
approaches the rightist position when aggregate income rises, even if the income distribution becomes
more unequal according to an inequality measure. For another concept in which the set of income
distributions with the same intermediate inequality is a parabola, see Krtscha (1994).
8obtained. Finally, since for any π ∈( π 1, π 2) the two distributions are non-compar-
able in terms of (x,π )-inequality, in this third case no conclusion in terms of
welfare can be reached either.
II.4. Operational Methods: The Heterogeneous Case
Let us now admit that we have a population of hG1 ,...,H households
which can differ in income, x
h, andor a vector of household characteristics. In
this paper, it is assumed that households of the same size have the same needs
and, therefore, their incomes are directly comparable. (See the Appendix where
each of the subgroups in the basic partition by household size is investigated.)
However, social evaluation within subgroups need not yield unanimous results.
Moreover, it is always convenient to extract conclusions for the population as
a whole. Therefore, a procedure is needed to establish inter-household welfare
comparisons. This is, of course, the role played by equivalence scales.
Assume that there are kG1 ,...,K household sizes. Denote by z
h the equival-
ent or the adjusted income of household h. Let x
k and z
k be the vectors of original
incomes and adjusted incomes, respectively, for households of size k. In principle,
we ﬁnd that it is reasonable to impose the following two conditions on any equiv-
alence scales procedure.




Condition 2. For any k and any π ∈[0, 1], I(x




Condition 1 reﬂects a normative value judgment according to which household
h’s adjusted income, being an individual concept, should be independent from
other individuals’ characteristics. In other words, it should only depend on indi-
vidual features—that is, the unadjusted income x
h, and the household size k—as
well as on a single dimensional parameter Θ whose role would be to characterize
the economies of scale in consumption within the household. Condition 2 requires
that, whatever the inequality concept we care to use, within each ethically homo-
geneous subgroup the adjustment process should not alter the underlying
inequality: the (x
k, π )-inequality of adjusted income should be equal to the (x
k, π )-
inequality of original income.






k)C(1Aπ )1], for some τ
k∈R.
In this way, household h’s adjusted income z











In order for condition 1 to be satisﬁed, we must have τ
kGf(k,Θ)m(x
k). In par-
ticular, Buhmann et al. (1988) and Coulter et al. (1992a, 1992b) suggest the fol-
lowing speciﬁcation: f(k,Θ) G(k
Θ –1)k
Θ ,Θ∈ [0, 1]. Then, adjusted income for




Θ ,Θ∈ [0, 1].
9This procedure recognizes that larger households have greater needs, but also
greater opportunities to achieve economies of scale in consumption. Taking a
single adult as the reference type, the expression k
Θ can be interpreted as the
number of equivalent adults in a household of size k. Thus, the greater Θ is, the
greater the number of equivalent adults for each household or, in other words,
the smaller the economies of scale. When Θ G0 and economies of scale are
assumed to be inﬁnite, adjusted income coincides with unadjusted household
income; while if Θ G1 and economies of scale are completely ruled out, then
adjusted income equals per capita household income. Notice that, given Θ, the
number of equivalent adults is a non-linear increasing function of k.





Consider the speciﬁcation τ





The parameter Θ can be interpreted now as the cost of an equivalent adult. The
problem is that such a cost is independent of household size. In search of a better
empirical speciﬁcation, Ruiz-Castillo (1998) requires that the mean of the adjusted
income distribution in the absolute case should be the same as the one obtained
in the relative case. That is, the following additional condition is imposed:
Condition 3. For each k, let z
k(k,Θ) denote the vector of adjusted
incomes of households of size k in the relative case. Then, for any other
equivalence scales procedure which gives rise to a vector z
k of adjusted
incomes, we must have: m(z
k)Gm(z
k(k,Θ)).




widely applied speciﬁcation presented in equation (3) for the relative case is






Compare equations (4) and (5). On one hand, the cost of an adult is now equal
to the mean income per equivalent adult. Moreover, rather than the number of
persons less one, such a cost is now multiplied by the number of equivalent adults
less one. Thus, as in the relative case, the greater Θ is for any k, the smaller
the economies of scale are within the household. However, on the other hand,
condition 1 has to be sacriﬁced.
Finally, consider the intermediate case in which π ∈ (0, 1). Let us make τ
kG
g(k,Θ, m(x









Clearly, the function s[k,Θ, m(x
k)] cannot be made independent from m(x
k) for
any value of π ∈ (0, 1). That is to say, in the intermediate case conditions 1 and 2
are incompatible. The question is: how should we proceed in practice? There are
two alternatives. Either the adjustment procedure of equation (3) for the relative
case is accepted, sacriﬁcing condition 2. Or the dependency of function
10s[k,1 ,m(x
k)] on m(x
k) is accepted, sacriﬁcing condition 1. In this case, given what
has been learned from the absolute case, condition 3 is required to be satisﬁed.






Thus, again, the greater Θ is for any k, the greater is τ
k and the smaller
the economies of scale are within the household. This second alternative which
satisﬁes conditions 2 and 3 is the one which is chosen in this paper.
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
III.1. The Data
As indicated in the Introduction, our data come from the 1980–81 and 1990–
91 EPFs—available at http:www.eco.uc3m.esepf.html. The EPFs are large,
comparable household budget surveys of 23,972 and 21,155 observations, respect-
ively, for a population of approximately 10 or 11 million households, or 37 and
38 million persons, occupying residential housing in all of Spain including the
North African cities of Ceuta and Melilla.
Household welfare is approximated by a measure of current consumption,
namely, household total current expenditure on private goods and services, net
of expenditures on the acquisition of certain durables, but inclusive of imputa-
tions for self-consumption, wages in kind, meals subsidized at work, and the
rental value for owner-occupied and other non-rental housing.
8 Total household
expenditures are expressed at constant prices of the winter of 1991 by means of
household speciﬁc statistical price indices.
9 Since the interest is in personal rather
than household welfare, we follow the usual practice of studying the personal
distribution in which each person is assigned the adjusted expenditures of the
household to which he or she belongs. All estimates use the blowing up factors
provided by the INE to obtain population rather than sample estimates.
Table 2 presents the change in mean household expenditures and demo-
graphic information for both the partition by household size and the population
as a whole. In the latter case, the results are presented as a function of Θ, the
parameter which reﬂects different alternatives about the generosity of the equiva-
lence scales. Smaller households consisting of one to four persons are more
important at the end of the decade, and the opposite is the case for larger house-
holds. Thus, whereas the household population grows by more than 10 percent,
the number of persons only increases by approximately 4 percent. Correspond-
ingly, household size decreases from 3.7 in 1980–81 to 3.41 in 1990–91.
There is an important growth of mean household expenditures in real terms
over the decade for all household types. Single person households and the large
group of four-person households, experience an increase in the mean of more
than 30 percent. At the opposite end, large households of seven persons grow
only about 17 percent. The increase for all other households falls, approximately,
8See Ruiz-Castillo (1998) for a discussion justifying why with EPF data this measure is the best
proxy for a household standard of living.
9For an explanation of the construction of these indexes, see Ruiz-Castillo et al. (2000).
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PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION BY PERSONS IN THE PARTITION BY HOUSEHOLD SIZE AND MEAN
HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURES AT WINTER 1991 PRICES: 1980–81 VERSUS 1990–91
Household Size
Personal Distr. in % 1234567 A l l
1980–81 2.1 11.4 15.1 25.5 20.1 12.5 6.8 93.5
1990–91 2.9 13.1 18.3 29.3 19.4 9.6 4.4 97.0
Percentage Change from 1980–81 to 1990–91 in Mean Household Expenditures, in %
Household Size 1234567
35.5 24.7 26.7 31.3 27.4 28.0 16.9
Population as a whole Θ G0.0 Θ G0.4 Θ G0.7 Θ G1.0
22.5 26.8 30.1 33.2
in the 2528 percent range. For the population as a whole, the smaller the econ-
omies of scale, the greater the growth in mean adjusted expenditure, which varies
between 22.5 and 33.2 percentage points.
III.2. Preûious Results
According to Shorrocks (1983) and Moyes (1987), one income distribution
provides greater social welfare than another according to all the SEFs in class
WR (or WA), if and only if the ﬁrst one has a larger mean and dominates the
second distribution in the relative (or absolute) Lorenz sense. To test whether this
is the case, Del Rı ´o and Ruiz-Castillo (1996) use asymptotically distribution-free
inference procedures developed by Bishop et al. (1989, 1994).
10 The main ﬁndings
are the following:
(1) For one-, two-, three- and ﬁve-member households, the 1990–91 house-
hold expenditures distribution dominates the 1980–81 one according to the rela-
tive Lorenz criterion. However, for four-, six- and seven-member households,
both distributions are statistically equivalent in the relative Lorenz sense.
(2) The 1990–91 household expenditures distribution for the total population
Lorenz-dominates the 1980–81 one for all Θ values. Taking into account that the
1990–91 mean household expenditures is always signiﬁcantly greater than the
1980–81 one, it can be concluded that in all cases there has been an unambiguous
increase in relative welfare according to all the SEFs in the class WR.
(3) The large increases in the mean, which cause absolute inequality to
increase ceteris paribus, outweigh the decrease in relative inequality in all of the
cases just reported. Thus, during the 1980s there has been a generalized increase
in absolute household expenditures inequality for all household sizes as well as
10Unlike the classical tests—see Beach and Davidson (1983), for instance—which only provide a
partition of the sample space into two regions—acceptance and rejection regions—the procedure used
by Bishop et al. (1989, 1994), based in the union-intersection principle makes it possible to distinguish
between three differentiated regions associated with dominance, equality and non-comparability
between the two situations under comparison. Richmond (1982) presents the methodology used to
construct joint conﬁdence intervals. Beach and Kaliski (1986) have extended this methodology to
samples which, like ours, involve weighted observations.
12for the total population. Therefore, no unambiguous conclusions can be obtained
in terms of all the SEFs in the class WA.
III.3 Results on Intermediate Inequality for the Population as a Whole
The results just summarized constitute a textbook example for an application
of a centrist approach. Let us denote by x and y the 1980–81 and 1990–91 distri-
butions, respectively. In terms of the notation introduced in section II, we must
search for a pair of values 0⁄π 1 ⁄π 2 ⁄1, where at least the ﬁrst or the last
inequality is strict. As can be seen in the Appendix, there are important differ-
ences in the social evaluation of households of different sizes. How do these differ-
ences become aggregated at the population level? In principle, the answer depends
on the way household size is taken into account in the deﬁnition of adjusted
household expenditure. In the Spanish case, an important ﬁnding is that the
results in Table 3 for the total population are rather robust to the choice of the
equivalence scales parameter Θ.
TABLE 3
AC OMPARISON OF THE 1980–81 VERSUS
1990–91 HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURES
DISTRIBUTIONS FROM AN INTERMEDIATE
INEQUALITY POINT OF VIEW: π -VALUES
FOR THE POPULATION AS A WHOLE AS A
FUNCTION OF THE EQUIVALENCE SCALES
PARAMETER Θ





Basically, for a relatively small set of centrist attitudes according to which
inequality is maintained if 11–14 percent or less of any excess aggregate expendi-
tures is distributed in absolute amounts, there is a decrease in inequality. For all
those who think that inequality is maintained if at least 25–29 percent is distrib-
uted in absolute amounts, inequality has increased. For the rest, inequality differ-
ences are not statistically signiﬁcant. Taking into account the increase in the mean
household expenditures, social welfare has unambiguously increased for all SEFs
in the class W(x, π ), where π [0.75, 1].
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Using empirical methods developed by Shorrocks (1983) and Moyes (1987),
it can be determined whether an income distribution y has a greater mean income,
less relative inequality, but more absolute inequality than distribution x. This is
exactly the case when x and y are taken to be, respectively, the 1980–81 and 1990–
91 household expenditures distributions, adjusted for household size, following a
decade of Socialist governments in Spain. What present methods cannot say is
13whether the reduction in relative inequality (or the increase in absolute inequality)
during the 1980s was ‘‘large’’ or ‘‘small.’’
This is a situation where centrist or inequality measures of inequality are
called for. This paper has presented the ﬁrst empirical application of this kind of
inequality concept. Among the ray-invariant intermediate inequality measures,
the (x, π )-inequality notion introduced in DRRC is used because it has a clear
economic interpretation and it can be made operational in the Shorrocks way.
To deal with the heterogeneous case, total expenditures of households of the same
size are assumed to be directly comparable, and an axiomatic justiﬁcation for a
widely used single parameter model of equivalence scales is provided.
Which are the politically correct centrist attitudes toward inequality to be
used in a given case? Lacking an answer to this question, our empirical procedure
allows the data to reveal for what type of intermediate inequality notions the
situation in 1990–91 in Spain is statistically equivalent or non-comparable to the
situation in 1980–81. This also reveals for what type of centrist attitudes there
has been a reduction or an increase in inequality during that period.
The results can be summarized as follows. In the ﬁrst place, for small house-
holds of three or fewer persons, inequality has decreased for those views accord-
ing to which inequality is maintained if 20 percent or less of any excess aggregate
expenditures is distributed in absolute amounts—while the rest is distributed
according to the household expenditures shares in the 1980–81 distribution. For
larger households, intermediate inequality has either remained constant or has
increased. In the second place, for the population as a whole the results are rather
robust to the importance we give to the economies of scale within the household:
inequality has decreased for those views according to which inequality is main-
tained if 11–14 percent or less of any excess aggregate expenditures is distributed
in absolute amounts. Globally, we take these results as implying that the decrease
in intermediate inequality in Spain during this period has been ‘‘small.’’
Nevertheless, in the international context among OECD countries this per-
formance is rather remarkable. As analyzed in detail in Del Rı ´o and Ruiz-Castillo
(2001), the extension of the coverage of the Social Security and the unemployment
subsidy systems, the increase in real terms of the minimum pension, the decrease
in the agricultural population coupled with a generous policy of agricultural sub-
sidies, among other factors, are all signiﬁcant forces which help to account for
the reduction of inequality during this period. From this perspective, the Spanish
experience could be of some interest to other countries undergoing a political and
economic transition, both in Latin America and in Eastern Europe.
A ﬁnal remark is in order. Let us assume that the 1990 income distribution
has both a greater mean and more relative inequality according to the usual
Lorenz criterion than the 1980 income distribution. Assume, however, that the
1990 distribution dominates the 1980 one according to the generalized Lorenz
criterion. This is the situation in the UK, for example. In terms of Figure 1, the
present methods allow us to conclude that the 1990 UK distribution falls in the
line 2–2 to the left of the relative ray O–R, and to the right of a ray drawn
through x but parallel to the vertical axis, which we will call a Paretian ray. The
question is: how can it be known—without using speciﬁc inequality measures
which require additional value judgments—whether the 1990 distribution is
14‘‘nearer’’ the ray O–R, reﬂecting a small increase in relative inequality, or
‘‘nearer’’ the Paretian ray, reﬂecting the opposite situation? Del Rı ´o (1996)
extends the methods presented in this paper to provide an operative answer to
this question.
APPENDIX:R ESULTS IN THE PARTITION BY HOUSEHOLD SIZE
As in the case of the entire population, in each subgroup of households of
the same size a pair of values π 1 and π 2 must be found, with 0⁄π 1 ⁄π 2 ⁄1, where
at least the ﬁrst or the last inequality is strict. The results are presented in Table
A-1. Household sizes are ordered, ﬁrst, by the minimum π 2 value, then by the
maximum π 1 value.
TABLE A-1
AC OMPARISON OF THE 1980–81 VERSUS
1990–91 HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURES
DISTRIBUTIONS FROM AN INTERMEDIATE
INEQUALITY POINT OF VIEW: π -VALUES
WITHIN THE PARTITION BY HOUSEHOLD
SIZE AS A FUNCTION OF THE
EQUIVALENCE SCALES PARAMETER Θ
Household Size π 2 π 1
3 persons 0.79 0.49
1 person 0.80 0.71
2 persons 0.80 0.60
5 persons 0.96 0.61
4 persons 1.00 0.83
6 persons 1.00 0.65
7 persons 1.00 0.07
Let us begin with three-person households for whom π 2 G0.79 and π 1 G0.49.
Consider the class of center-right attitudes for which inequality is maintained as
long as (1Aπ 2)100G(1A0.79)100G21 percent or less of any excess income is
distributed in absolute amounts, while the remaining amount is distributed
according to the 1980–81 household expenditures shares. For this class inequality
has decreased during the 1980s. For all center-left people for whom inequality is
maintained only if at least (1Aπ 1)100G(1A0.49)100G51 percent of any excess
income is distributed in absolute amounts, inequality has increased. For those in
between, both distributions are statistically equivalent. Taking into account that
mean household expenditures have increased by 26.7 percent, for three-person
households social welfare has increased unambiguously for all SEFs in the class
W(x, π ), where π ∈ [0.49, 1]. There is nothing that can be said about social welfare
for people whose intermediate notion of inequality is represented by a lower π
value.
A similar analysis can be made for one-, two- and ﬁve-person households.
The situation for all other household sizes for which π 2G1.0 is quite different.
Let us take four-person households, for instance. As far as inequality is con-
cerned, the only statement that can be supported is that for the class of center-
right attitudes for which inequality is maintained if 17 percent or less of any excess
15income is distributed in absolute amounts, inequality is equivalent in both situ-
ations. Therefore, for those intermediate inequality views, social welfare has
increased. For the rest of the people with a centrist perception of inequality, the
four-person household expenditures inequality has increased during this period.
Hence, no conclusion can be obtained in terms of the class of SEFs W(x, π ) for all
π ∈[0, 0.83].
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